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While Centers for Disease Control and Prevention believe that most state 
governments under-fund tobacco-control programs, little is known about 
why large variation in spending exists between state governments. This 
study explores reasons for spending variation through an econometric 
model of per capita spending on tobacco-control programs that explores 
the effects of smoking prevalence while holding constant tobacco 
settlement funds, state budget deficits, and other factors that might also 
be expected to influence spending variation. Empirical evidence indicates 
no support for the hypothesis that states with high smoking prevalence 
spend more on tobacco-control than other states. This finding may be 
quite surprising to those working in areas of public health and clearly leads 
to many important policy questions regarding why the data indicate that 
funding does not appear to bear any relation to perceived public health 
problems as would be predicted if policymakers were following a ‘rational 
needs’ approach to funding. 
I. Introduction control programs would reduce the number of 
adults who smoke by promoting quitting, prevent 
Controlling tobacco use has become an important young people from ever starting, reduce exposure to 
policy issue addressed by state governments. State secondhand smoke, and identify and eliminate 
governments spent $883 160 197 and $762 338 414 in disparities in tobacco use among population groups. 
years 2001 and 2002, respectively, on tobacco-control Despite literature indicating effectiveness of 
programs.1 Centers for Disease Control and tobacco control programs, little is known about 
Prevention (CDC) have established recommended how state spending decisions on tobacco-control 
funding levels in Best Practices for Comprehensive programs are determined and, more specifically, 
Tobacco Control Programs (1999) and currently why there exists substantial variation in funding of 
believe that actual (state and federal) spending in all state programs.3 As described below, average per 
states is a little over one-half of ‘lower-bound’ or capita state funding was $3.18 in 2001 and $3.27 in 
minimum Best Practices spending recommendations.2 2002, with ranges of $0–$20.69 in 2001 and $0–$18.15 
CDC believes that adequate funding of tobacco in 2002. If variation can be shown to be 
1 CDC (1999). Arizona and Massachusetts did not provide data for 2002 because their budgets had not been finalized at the
 
time the CDC’s publication went to press.
 
2 Best Practices spending is estimated based on nine program elements: community programs to reduce tobacco use; chronic
 
disease programs to reduce the burden of tobacco-related diseases; school programs; enforcement; statewide programs;
 
counter-marketing; cessation programs; surveillance and evaluation; and administration and management.
 
3 See, for example, Hu et al. (1995a, b), Farrelly et al. (2003) and Tauras et al. (2005).
 
systematically related to factors that reflect urgency 
of public health concerns, such as differences in 
smoking prevalence, then variation would appear to 
promote CDC’s goal of controlling tobacco use 
within the country as a whole. If, for example, high-
spending states were also those with the highest 
prevalence of smoking, then funding variation might 
reflect an efficient allocation of funding resources. 
For instance, systematically spending more in states 
characterized by relatively high tobacco use and less 
in states with relatively low tobacco use might be 
justified if the goal is to lower national tobacco use 
toward some pre-determined goal. 
This study seeks to determine the degree to which 
spending variation is systematically related to factors 
that reflect urgency of public health concerns. This 
study uses a newly-available and publicly-available 
data set on tobacco-control expenditures during 2001 
and 2002 in which over $1.6 billion were allocated.4 
Reasons for this variation are explored through an 
econometric model of spending on tobacco-control 
programs that explores the independent effects of 
smoking prevalence while holding constant tobacco 
settlement funds, state budget deficits, and other 
factors that might also be expected to influence 
spending variation between states. 
II. Spending on Tobacco-Control Programs 
State spending on tobacco control programs comes 
from a variety of sources. In 2002, for instance, 
46 states received more than $6 billion in tobacco 
settlement revenues (Master Settlement Agreement), 
and the four states – Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi 
and Texas that settled independently with the 
tobacco industry also received substantial revenue.5 
Settlement revenues were based on a formula that 
included smoking-attributable state Medicaid 
expenses. The Master Settlement Agreement did not 
dictate how funds were to be allocated, although the 
public health community had hoped that states would 
significantly expand funding of tobacco-control 
programs. Recent evidence, however, indicates that 
4 CDC (2001) and CDC (2002). 
5 GAO (2004). 
6 
relatively few settlement dollars have gone toward 
tobacco-control and there is some perception that 
many of these dollars have gone toward closing state 
government deficits and costs associated with general 
health care programs.6 Keeler et al. (2004) argue that, 
in reaction to the Master Settlement Agreement of 
1998, advertising by tobacco firms rose and partially 
offset (from 33 to 57%) effects of higher cigarette 
prices thus suggesting that effects of the tobacco 
settlement on smoking prevalence are complicated to 
predict. 
It should be understood, however, that an account­
ing of where tobacco settlement revenues have been 
allocated cannot provide a clear picture of overall 
state spending on tobacco-control. State governments 
fund tobacco control programs through a variety of 
general sources such as income and property taxes as 
well as from more specific revenue sources such as 
taxes on tobacco and alcohol. For example, 12 states 
appropriated $14 million from general revenue to 
support tobacco control programs in 2002.7 Over 
$8 billion in 2004 was collected in cigarette tax 
revenue in the 50 states and some of these dollars 
could also have funded tobacco-control programs.8 
Government funds are fungible in the sense that an 
increase in funding from a specific revenue source 
such as the tobacco settlement may take place at the 
same time that funds from other sources rise, fall or 
remain the same. In other words, budgeting is 
dynamic in the sense that a change in funding from 
one source may trigger a change in another source.9 
If a state allocates $50 million from settlement funds 
to fund tobacco-control programs, the same state 
may at the same time raise or lower allocations from 
excise taxes, income taxes, or property taxes that 
result in increases, decreases or no changes in overall 
funding of tobacco-control programs.10 Total spend­
ing on tobacco-control is the correct metric to 
examine, not individual funding sources in this 
dynamic funding world. This discussion is not 
meant to argue that examination of how state 
governments allocate funds from the tobacco settle­
ment, or from other sources such as excise taxes on 
tobacco, is not useful. Clearly, increased spending on 
tobacco-control must be funded from somewhere and 
See e.g. Gross et al. (2002), Johnson (2004) and Sloan et al. (2005). 
7 CDC (2002). 
8 Orzechowski and Walker (2004). 
9 Marlow and Shiers (1999) discuss this issue when they examine whether higher public funding of crime-related programs 
leads to changes in public education funding. 
10 Funding also comes from federal and private sources. Federal funding comes from CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health 
that manages the National Tobacco Control Program and the Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Substance Abuser and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); see CDC (2002). 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: tobacco control expenditures 
per capita 
State Federal State Federal 
2001 2001 2002 2002 
Average ($) 3.18 0.56 3.27 0.73 
Median ($) 2.23 0.31 2.77 0.44 
Maximum ($) 20.69 2.70 18.15 3.17 
Minimum ($) 0 0.04 0 0.05 
SD 3.97 0.57 3.42 0.68 
Sample size 50 50 48 48 
public heath advocates naturally scrutinize current 
spending allocations from tobacco-related revenue 
sources. Data examined in this article – tobacco-
control spending – reflect final overall funding of 
tobacco control programs as defined by CDC and 
reflect final allocations from multiple revenue 
11 sources. 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of per capita 
spending on tobacco-control programs in 2001 and 
2002. Data are available for all 50 states in 2001 and 
48 states in 2002. Funding estimates were not 
available at the time of publication for Arizona and 
Massachusetts. Average per capita state funding was 
$3.18 in 2001 and $3.27 in 2002, with ranges of $0 
(Connecticut, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania and Tennessee) to $20.69 (Ohio) in 
2001 and $0 (Tennessee) to $18.15 (Ohio) in 2002. 
Median per capita state spending was $2.23 in 2001 
and $2.77 in 2002. Average per capita federal funding 
was $0.56 in 2001 and $0.73 in 2002, with ranges of 
$0.04 (California) to $2.70 (Vermont) in 2001 and 
$0.05 (Florida) to $3.18 (Vermont) in 2002. Median 
per capita federal spending was $0.31 in 2001 and 
$0.44 in 2002. The data therefore indicate substantial 
variation in state spending and that state spending 
dominates overall spending. The data are not 
disaggregated and we cannot single out various 
programs such as counter-advertising expenditures 
vs. counselling expenditures vs. any other spending 
category. This is unfortunate because substantial 
variation in how states allocate funds to various 
programs is likely and it would be useful to observe 
how states choose among competing spending 
options. Such information might prove useful in 
determining relative effectiveness of competing 
spending options in controlling tobacco use. 
Gross et al. (2002) study state spending in 2001 and 
is the only empirical study that directly examines 
variation in state tobacco-control spending. Primary 
conclusions are that state health issues (e.g. Medicaid 
expenditures and proportion of the population 
without health insurance) exert little effect on state 
spending and therefore tobacco settlement funds 
represent a mostly untapped revenue source for 
expanding state tobacco-control programs. While 
this study examined numerous variables that might 
influence tobacco-control spending, the statistical 
techniques used do not lend themselves to estimating 
causal determinants of tobacco-control spending. 
Stepwise regression and Spearman’s rank correlation 
were the two methods used to examine data. The 
stepwise regression process was based on the criteria 
that variables with p � 0.10 would be retained and, 
in effect, is a technique designed to maximize R2’s of 
estimated equations.12 Stepwise regression is an 
exercise that, in effect, forces data to determine the 
model and is not very useful to test hypotheses 
stemming from theory involving a dependent variable 
and two or more independent variables. Estimation 
of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients is suitable 
for considering only the relationship between two 
variables and thus does not appear to be suitable for 
an investigation of why spending on tobacco-control 
varies widely between states. 
III. Modelling Determinants of State 
Tobacco-Control Funding 
Tobacco-control programs are, in theory, aimed at 
curbing smoking prevalence which suggests that an 
efficient allocation funds on the basis of smoking 
prevalence. That is, states with higher smoking 
prevalence would receive greater funding than states 
with lower prevalence as long as greater funding is 
believed to lower prevalence. Therefore, an efficient 
allocation of resources across states would yield a 
positive relation between funding and prevalence. 
This prediction is consistent within a world where 
11 CDC (2002) notes limitations to its data collection. Reported amounts exclude appropriations for multiple purposes that 
included an unspecified amount of funding for tobacco control. State spending data are based on appropriations, rather than 
expenditures, and expenditures may differ from appropriated amounts, because of delays in implementation, program cuts, or 
establishment of trusts or endowments. 
12 As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p. 88) state: ‘While stepwise regression can be useful in looking at data when there are a 
large number of possible explanatory variables, it is of little value when one is attempting to analyze a model statistically. 
The reason is that t and F-tests consider the test of a null hypothesis under the assumption that the model is correctly 
specified.’ 
resources are allocated within a central planning 
model whereby policymakers attempt to allocate 
resources toward highest-valued uses.13 
A similar prediction would arise under a federalist 
system of state governments. State officials might also 
allocate more resources in states with higher pre­
valence because needs are presumably greater in these 
states than states with lower prevalence. For example, 
it is predictable that cold weather states spend more 
on snow removal than warm climate states since 
that’s where the snow is. States with more smokers 
could then be predicted to spend more on tobacco-
control than states with fewer smokers as long as 
policymakers are efficiently allocating resources 
under the ‘rational needs’ approach to funding and 
believe that greater funding lowers prevalence. 
An important implication here is that there should 
be some clear pattern or order concerning tobacco-
control funding when resources are allocated effi­
ciently across states. This pattern is also not 
dependent upon resources being allocated by a 
central government because a federalist system of 
state governments would follow a similar pattern as 
long as they are interested in efficiently allocating 
resources with the goal of curbing smoking pre­
valence. States with high prevalence should therefore 
exhibit more spending on tobacco-control than states 
with low prevalence since otherwise it is as if snow 
removal does not bear any connection to climate. 
Moreover, even if states within a federalist system do 
not follow the ‘rational needs’ approach, the central 
government may promote the ‘rational needs’ 
approach to funding by granting funds to states on 
the basis of supporting a pattern whereby total – state 
and central funding is positively related to smoking 
prevalence. 
Endogeneity is an issue of concern if the causal 
relationship between tobacco-control spending and 
smoking prevalence is actually two-way. While 
smoking prevalence may influence tobacco-control 
spending, another direction may be that tobacco-
control spending influences smoking prevalence. 
Disentanglement of these two causal effects is a 
critical issue here because otherwise we cannot 
distinguish between two very different interpretations 
of the literature’s finding that tobacco-control 
spending lowers tobacco use.14 While authors of 
previous studies have argued that tobacco-control 
spending causes lower tobacco use, a counter-
interpretation is that lower smoking prevalence 
causes higher tobacco-control spending as consistent 
with the hypothesis that states with less tolerance for 
smoking (as indicated by relatively low smoking 
prevalence) will also fund tobacco-control programs 
more generously. Separation of these effects is 
essential when we wish to examine effectiveness of 
tobacco-control programs and whether the direction 
and magnitude of state spending on control programs 
should be altered. The possibility of two-way 
causality between tobacco-control spending and 
smoking prevalence is addressed by estimating 
models of tobacco-control spending with two-stage 
least squares. Ordinary least squares produces biased 
and inconsistent estimates of coefficients in the 
presence of simultaneity. 
The following model of state spending on tobacco-
control is estimated by two-stage least squares for 
each of 2 years, 2001 and 2002. 
FUNDi ¼ fðYi,TSi,UEi,DEBTi,FOURi,SMOKERiÞ 
ð1Þ 
The first-stage equation is 
SMOKERi ¼ fðYi,TSi,UEi,DEBTi,FOURi, 
POPULATIONi,DENSITYi,TOBSTATEiÞ 
ð2Þ 
The instruments for the first-stage estimation are 
all independent variables in Equation 1 except 
SMOKERi and the addition of the following 
variables: state population, urban density, and a 
dichotomous variable that equals one if the state has 
a significant tobacco manufacturing presence 
(Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, South 
Carolina and Virginia) and zero otherwise. Variables 
are defined along with summary statistics in Table 2. 
State per capita funding of tobacco-control pro­
grams (FUNDi) is obtained from the previously 
discussed CDC data set. State median income of a 
four-person family (Yi) is obtained from the US 
An economically efficient allocation does not necessarily mean that states with high prevalence should spend more on 
control if, for instance, programs are not equally effective or when states have heterogeneous policy objectives. Differences in 
demographics across states might also lead to spending differences across states under a ‘rational needs’ approach. For 
example, Yen (2005) finds that smoking falls with education, but older smokers consume more cigarettes than younger 
smokers, in the USA. Goel and Nelson (2005) find significant differences in tobacco consumption across age and gender as 
well in the USA. Following the Bask and Melkersson (2004) argument that alcohol and cigarette consumption are 
simultaneous decisions, tobacco-control policy should perhaps also be influenced by alcohol consumption in states. Such 
differences might suggest, for instance, that state spending should differ according to age, gender and other characteristics of 
the population, even when states have similar overall smoking prevalence. 
14 See Hu et al.(1995a, b), Farrelly et al. (2003) and Tauras et al. (2005). 
13 
Table 2. Summary statistics of variables, 2002 
Definition Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
POPULATIONi ¼ state population in thousands 5747 4098 499 34 988 
DENSITYi ¼ urban-percent of state population 71.7% 71.5 38.2 94.4 
TOBSTATEi ¼ 1 if tobacco-producing state; ¼ 0 otherwise 0.12 0.0 0.0 1.0 
FUNDi ¼ state per capita funding of tobacco-control programs ($) 3.27 2.77 0 18.15 
TSi ¼ state per capita tobacco settlement funds ($) 31.86 30.60 13.62 73.35 
UEi ¼ state unemployment rate (%) 5.32 5.40 3.3 7.6 
Yi ¼ state median income of a four-person family ($) $58 633 $57 624 $44 947 $75 505 
FOURSTATEi ¼ for states with long-standing programs; ¼ 0 otherwise 0.08 0.0 0.0 1.0 
DEBTi ¼ state government per capita deficit or surplus ($) $182.19 $134.74 $�295.74 $1171.72 
SMOKERi ¼ percent of adult population who smoke (%) 23.41 23.15 12.70 32.60 
Census and is hypothesized to be positively related to 
tobacco-control spending based on the expectation 
that such funding is a ‘normal’ good – voters demand 
higher funding as their incomes rise. State per capita 
tobacco settlement funds (TSi) is hypothesized to be 
positively related to tobacco-control spending based 
on expectation that some portion of these revenues 
would flow into tobacco-control programs. These 
data are reported in McKinley et al. (2003) and 
include funds by all states regardless of whether or 
not they participated in the Master Settlement 
Agreement. Inclusion of a dichotomous variable 
reflecting whether or not a state participated in the 
Master Settlement Agreement did not affect results 
of this article and so are not displayed here. 
The state unemployment rate (UEi) controls for the 
economic condition of states and is obtained from 
Census data. It is expected to negatively influence 
tobacco-control spending because higher values 
indicate greater concerns with income-stabilization 
concerns of state governments which then may cause 
states to lower funding of tobacco-control. 
If tobacco-control is viewed as a longer-term problem 
by state legislatures and governors, they may be 
willing to forgo some of its funding as unemployment 
rises. State government deficit or surplus per capita 
(DEBTi) is included to control for the expectation 
that higher deficits indicate greater fiscal duress that 
results in lower spending on tobacco-control. 
A dichotomous variable (FOURi) equals one for 
the four states (Arizona, California, Massachusetts 
and Oregon) with long-standing and comprehensive 
tobacco-control programs; and equals zero otherwise. 
These four states were early pioneers in tobacco-
control programs since most states have only recently 
15 CDC (2001) and CDC (2002). 
16 See CDC (2004). 
been funding programs in a comprehensive effort 
aimed at lowering tobacco use.15 It is expected that 
these four states will more generously fund state 
tobacco-control programs and so this variable is 
hypothesized to be positively related to tobacco-
control spending. 
The percent of the adult population who smoke 
(SMOKERi) controls for the perceived need to fund 
tobacco-control by policymakers as well as public 
sentiment regarding smoking. Cigarette smoking 
is defined as persons who reported having smoked 
100 or more cigarettes during their lifetime and who 
currently smoke every day or some days and 
is based on the Behavioural Risk Factor 
Surveillance System, a telephone survey of health 
behaviours of the civilian, noninstitutionalized US 
population, 18 years old and over.16 The expected 
sign on SMOKERi is ambiguous. The ‘rational needs’ 
allocation framework predicts that higher funding 
arises with greater needs as indicated by higher 
smoking prevalence and so state officials spend 
more on tobacco-control programs in states with 
more smokers. However, higher smoking prevalence 
may also indicate greater support for smoking and 
therefore less public sentiment that state governments 
should generously fund tobacco-control programs. 
This possibility is consistent with previous research 
showing that the probability that states pass laws 
prohibiting smoking in public places is influenced by 
factors such as whether states have significant degrees 
of tobacco-related jobs and smokers. Dunham and 
Marlow (2000) find that presences of a state smoking 
law are influenced by whether or not a state has a 
significant tobacco presence and Hersch et al. (2004) 
find that state smoking laws are responsive to voter 
preferences in a state. These results suggest that, 
because states with relatively few smokers or tobacco-
related jobs are more likely to pass laws prohibiting 
smoking, states with relatively few smokers may be 
more likely to generously fund tobacco-control 
programs. Given the conflicting hypotheses, the sign 
on SMOKERi is an empirical question to be resolved 
through data examination. 
A measure of youth smoking was also considered 
as a control for public sentiment regarding smoking. 
State control efforts are presumably also directed at 
those initiating smoking, namely adolescents. Youth 
smoking was measured as percent of current cigarette 
smoking by students in grades 9–12 as defined by 
having smoked cigarettes on 1 or more of the 30 days 
preceding the survey. Data was obtained from 
CDC (2002) and was available for 46 states in 2002. 
Results are not displayed here because they did not 
differ from the case of adult smoking prevalence and 
because its use resulted in a smaller sample size. 
Because the amount of settlement dollars per capita 
is derived through estimation of smoking-related 
Medicaid costs, it is possible that states with higher 
smoking prevalence rates are likely to receive more 
generous tobacco settlement allocations. That is, if 
smoking prevalence is directly related to settlement 
income, smoking prevalence and settlement funds 
may be collinear. However, simple correlation 
coefficients between smoking prevalence and state 
per capita settlement funds are 0.05 (2001) and 0.04 
(2002) thus suggesting that multi-collinearity between 
SMOKERi and TSi is of little concern. 
Measures of political party affiliation 
(dichotomous variable equal to one if a state had a 
democratic governor and zero otherwise, and share 
of population voting for a democratic presidential 
candidate) were included as explanatory variables 
to examine whether political differences explained 
any of the variation in tobacco-control spending 
across states. Results with these measures are not 
displayed here because they were not found to exert 
statistically significant effects on tobacco-control 
spending. 
It is possible that there might be differential 
variance by size of state. Equations are estimated 
with SE and variances that are computed using 
White’s (1980) covariance estimator which estimates 
the coefficient covariances in the presence of hetero­
skedasticity of unknown form. These estimates 
provided a slight gain in statistical significance of 
several variables over estimates using ordinary least 
squares and so these estimates are displayed in this 
article. 
IV. Estimates of Tobacco-Control Spending 
Equations 
Table 3 displays two-stage least squares estimation of 
state tobacco control spending in 2001 and 2002. 
Three variables exhibit significant t-statistics (tobacco 
settlement funds, unemployment rates, and four-state 
dummy) in 2001 and four variables exhibit significant 
Table 3. Two-stage least squares estimation of per capita state spending on tobacco- ontrol estimated coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2001 2002 
Smoker Tobacco-control Smoker Tobacco-control 
Population 2.7E � 06 (0.04) �9.1 (1.24)
 
Urban �0.55 (1.60) 0.08** (2.10)
 
Tobacco-state 2.21*** (1.83) 3.08* (2.76)
 
Tobacco settlement funds per capita 0.01 (0.34) 0.09*** (1.92) 0.03 (0.84) 0.10* (3.51)
 
Unemployment 0.99* (3.08) �2.24*** (2.01) 1.13* (3.03) �1.10** (2.07)
 
Median income 1.4E � 05 (0.26) �3.6E � 05 (0.44) �4.3E � 05 (0.90) �4.4E � 05 (0.76)
 
Four state �3.48* (3.14) 10.16** (2.38) �1.94 (1.51) 3.18*** (1.91)
 
Deficit/surplus per capita 0.003*** (1.69) �0.004 (0.83) �0.001 (0.23) 0.003*** (1.99)
 
smoker 1.32 (1.50) 0.08 (0.29)
 
Constant 21.52* (8.54) �18.66 (1.09) 25.13* (8.81) 5.92 (0.76)
 
Observations 50 50 48 48
 
F-Statistic 3.65 1.71 3.67 1.99
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003 0.143 0.003 0.09
 
R2 (adjusted) 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.11 
Mean dependent variable 23.41 3.18 23.41 3.27 
Note: *, ** and *** Significance (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
t-statistics in 2002 (tobacco settlement funds, unem­
ployment rates, four-state dummy, and deficit/ 
surplus). However, estimation does not exceed critical 
F-values using 2001 data and only barely exceeds the 
critical F-value using 2002 data (p ¼ 0.09). Thus, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that, as a group, the 
independent variables do not influence per capita 
state spending on tobacco-control in 2001. We can 
reject this hypothesis in 2002, but only 11% of the 
variation in state spending on tobacco-control is 
explained in this model. The estimated coefficient on 
per capita tobacco settlement funds is 0.10 in 2002 
and indicates that, for every additional settlement 
dollar, states would spend 10 cents of that dollar on 
tobacco-control. 
First-stage estimation using 2001 data indicates 
that the share of the adult population that smokes is 
significantly influenced by whether or not the state 
produces tobacco (positive effect), unemployment 
rates (positive effect), whether the state has a long-
standing tobacco-control program (negative effect), 
and the deficit/surplus variable (positive effect). 
Estimation using 2002 data indicates that the share 
of the adult population that smokes is significantly 
influenced by urbanization (positive effect), whether 
or not the state produces tobacco (positive effect), 
and unemployment rates (positive effect). Estimation 
in both years exceeds critical F-values thus indicating 
that we can reject the hypothesis that, as a group, the 
independent variables do not influence smoking 
prevalence. 
Table 4. Two-stage least squares estimation of per capita 
coefficients 
Table 4 displays estimations of per capita state and 
federal spending on tobacco-control to examine 
whether our results change when we examine total 
spending on tobacco-control. An examination of 
total spending would be appropriate if state govern­
ments base spending plans on expectations of federal 
involvement. While one scenario is that states with 
relatively high values of state spending exhibit high 
prevalence to solicit federal funds through matching 
grant and other types of federal programs, it is also 
possible that state policymakers might view federal 
spending more as a substitute for state spending. 
Federal spending decisions might also somehow 
smooth out state spending decisions in the sense 
that states with greater needs – such as higher 
smoking prevalence – receive greater federal spending 
support. This latter possibility does not appear to be 
operative because simple correlations between smok­
ing prevalence and per capita federal spending are less 
than 10% in both years. 
Table 4 displays two-stage least squares estimation 
of total (state and federal) tobacco control spending 
in 2001 and 2002. The same variables exhibit 
significant t-statistics as before in estimations of 
state tobacco-control spending. We still cannot reject 
the hypothesis that, as a group, the independent 
variables do not influence per capita state and federal 
spending on tobacco-control in 2001, but we can 
reject this hypothesis in 2002. The estimated coeffi­
cient on per capita tobacco settlement funds is 0.11 in 
2002 and indicates that, for every additional 
state and federal spending on tobacco-control estimated 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2001 2002 
Smoker Tobacco-control Smoker Tobacco-control 
Population 2.7E � 06 (0.04) �9.1 (1.24)
 
Urban �0.05 (1.60) 0.08** (2.10)
 
Tobacco-state 2.21*** (1.83) 3.08* (2.76)
 
Tobacco settlement funds per capita 0.01 (0.34) 0.10** (2.59) 0.03 (0.84) 0.11* (3.38)
 
Unemployment 0.99* (3.08) �1.89*** (2.00) 1.13* (3.03) �1.53** (2.56)
 
Median income 1.4E � 05 (0.26) �5.0E � 05 (0.65) �4.3E � 05 (0.90) �2.6E � 05 (0.41)
 
Four state �3.48* (3.14) 7.07** (2.31) �1.94 (1.51) 3.97** (2.12)
 
Deficit/surplus per capita 0.003*** (1.69) �0.001 (0.14) �0.001 (0.23) 0.004** (2.28)
 
Smoker 0.76 (1.16) 0.20 (0.68)
 
Constant 21.52* (8.54) �6.05 (0.52) 25.13* (8.81) 5.92 (0.76)
 
Observations 50 50 48 48
 
F-Statistic 3.65 1.76 3.67 2.56
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003 0.130 0.003 0.03
 
R2 (adjusted) 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.15 
Mean dependent variable 23.41 3.73 23.41 4.00 
Note: *, ** and *** Significance (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
settlement dollar per capita, states would spend 11 
cents of that dollar on tobacco-control. First-stage 
estimations are identical to those previously discussed 
in Table 3. 
V. Conclusions 
This study finds no evidence that tobacco-control 
spending by state governments in 2001 was influenced 
by tobacco settlement funds, unemployment rates, 
median state income, prevalence of smokers, whether 
or not a state had a long-standing tobacco-control 
program, or by size of state government deficits or 
surpluses. The empirical evidence thus indicates little 
to no information on why tobacco-control spending 
varied between states in 2001. In 2002, however, 
evidence for four significant influences is indicated: 
tobacco settlement funds exerted positive influences, 
unemployment rates exerted negative influences, state 
with long-standing programs exerted positive influ­
ences, and deficits exerted positive influences on 
tobacco-control spending. But, the model explains no 
more than 15% of spending variation in 2002. 
In sum, examined variables explain very little of the 
variation in over $1.6 billion of spending in 2001 
and 2002. 
The main empirical finding that there is very little 
or no correlation between tobacco-control and 
smoking prevalence across states should be of 
concern to those who believe in a ‘rational needs’ 
approach to public funding. This result is consistent 
with studies showing that higher public health 
spending does not necessarily lead to better health 
outcomes. Berger and Messer (2002) examine the link 
between public financing of health spending and 
health outcomes across OECD countries and finds 
that health outcomes are inversely related to the 
proportion of their expenditures that are publicly 
financed. Self and Grabowski (2003) conclude that, 
while higher spending may raise health outcomes in 
middle- to less-developed countries, there is little 
evidence that higher public spending on health 
improves health outcomes in wealthy countries. 
The results may be quite surprising to those 
working in areas of public health and clearly leads 
to many important policy questions regarding why 
the data indicate that funding does not appear to bear 
any relation to perceived public health problems as 
would be predicted if policymakers were following a 
‘rational needs’ approach to funding. As previously 
discussed, this empirical result might indicate that the 
‘rational needs’ approach to funding is somehow 
cancelled-out by efforts of groups who are not 
motivated to curb smoking prevalence. Such groups 
may include smokers themselves as well as businesses 
that profit from sales of cigarettes such as retailers, 
tobacco manufactures, and bars and taverns. Some 
state governments may as well experience mixed 
feelings regarding tobacco-control when they rely on 
tobacco taxes to fund general government programs. 
In other words, in states with high prevalence the 
tendency to spend more due to health concerns may 
be cancelled out by those with opposing interests 
since it is more difficult to organize a lobby opposed 
to smoking in states with many smokers. Weak or 
nonexistent correlation between tobacco-control 
funding and smoking prevalence supports this 
explanation of why the funding data do not appear 
to be based on the ‘rational needs’ approach. 
If tobacco-control dollars are not following the 
problem of smoking prevalence, is it possible that 
dollars are following something else? One possibility 
is that funding follows political support in some 
states in the sense that more politicians and voters 
sympathetic to tobacco-control are found in states 
with low smoking prevalence and so it is easier to 
raise money in states with fewer smokers. This 
possibility might mean that the fact that a state 
spends more and has low smoking prevalence may 
not signify the effectiveness of tobacco-control 
programs, but rather that it is just easier to raise 
funds in a low-prevalence state. Funding unrelated to 
smoking prevalence may then be consistent with a 
world where some states follow the ‘rational needs’ 
approach and other states have funding levels 
influenced more by those opposed to controlling 
tobacco use. A similar question is whether states with 
higher tobacco taxes may also be causing lower 
smoking prevalence or does lower prevalence simply 
make it easier to raise tobacco taxes in some states? 
Better understanding of the determinants of tobacco-
control allocations across states and whether or not 
these allocations are causally-related to smoking 
behaviour are issues that deserve further attention. 
The results of this study would appear to suggest the 
importance of re-examining recent proposals by the 
CDC for substantial increases in tobacco-control 
spending in light of the evidence showing little to no 
connection between what states spend on tobacco-
control and levels of smoking prevalence. 
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